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Science and Art: 
Heuristic and Aesthetic Dimensions 
of Scientific Discovery 
Marx W. Wartofsky 
Einstein's epochal 1905 paper, for which he was awarded the 1921 Nobel Prize, is 
entitled "Concerning a Heuristic Point of View About the Creation and T ransformarion 
of Light." In this paper, Einstein proposed, among other things, that the photoelectric 
effect-in which electrons are emitted from the surface of cenain metals illuminated by 
certain frequencies of visible light or by ultraviolet radiation-can be made more 
intelligible if the energies of the impinging radiation are conceived of as discrete quanta 
or photons. What problem was Einstein addressing? And in what sense was his proposed 
solution the adoprcion of a "heuristic point of view"? What exactly does "heuristic" mean 
here? And how does it, in this signal instance, relate to questions of aesthetic form in rhe 
actual work of scientific inquiry and in those high moments of scientific discovery? 
These are the questions I hope co address in this paper. But to proceed heuristically 
with my own project, I will begin by telling a story of sorts-in effect, a parable. Like other 
parables, fables and moral tales, the story is well-known, and I can give only a crude and 
condensed version of it here. I will point the moral and draw its consequences later. The 
story concerns (as one might have guessed) Einstein's 1905 paper. 
Einstein begins his paper with characteristic daricy, posing the problem succinctly: 
There is a profound formal difference between the theoretical ideas 
which physicists have formed concerning gases and other ponderable bodies 
and the Maxwell theory of electromagnetic processes in so-called empty 
space.1 
What is at issue here, for Einstein, is the difference between particles and fields, 
between a physics of bodies moving in space, and a physics of waves or undulations in 
a medium. As lon.g as matter could be conceived of in terms of discrete, finite quantities 
specifying the states of the classical mechanical parameters (e.g. position, mass, time); 
and as long as radiation could be conceived of in terms of the continuous functions of 
an electromagnetic field, the two universes of physics could be held apart, as matter and 
radiation. Newton had, of course, proposed a unified view of both matter and oflight­
radiation at least, conceiving oflight as corpuscular, thus constituted of bodies in motion 
just as matter was. But by the early 19th century, this theory had been replaced by the 
wave theory of light of Young and Fresnel. Yet, early in the century ( 1839), Becquerel 
(senior) had reported that illumination of one of a pair of metal plates immersed in a 
dilute acid solution effected a change in the electromotive force of the cell. Later, Smith, 
Hertz, Halbwachs and Lenard investigated aspects of this interaction of radiation and 
matter in the photoelectric effect; and by 1900, Elster and Geitel formulated the first law 
of this effect, proposing that the number of electrons emitted by the metal surfaces was 
directly proportional to the intensity of radiation. And in 1902, Lenard had established 
that rthe maximum kinetic energy of an electron emitted under radiation depended only 
on the frequency of the radiation, and was independent of its intensity. 
What was problematic, in the given state of physical theory, was how the kinetic 
energy of the emitted electron could be independent of the intensity of radiation, since 
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in the Maxwell equations, radianc energy varies continuously, and the intensity is fixed 
by the magnitude of the electncal field. The problem chen was co fonnulace the 
interaction of matter and radiation in such a way as to explain the dependency of the 
maximum kinetic energy of the emitted electrons on the frequency of the impinging 
radiation alone. 
Einstein's solution to the problem was as simple as it was ingenious: it was to conceive 
of radiation as being like matter in its form or structure-i.e. as having a discrete, 
discontinuous or particulate structure, without, however, being "ponderable", i.e. 
without having mass. Th.is would then yield a distinct proportionality between such a 
quantized series of  frequencies and the energy absorbed by the emitted electrons in the 
photoelectric effect. Planck's earlier work on black,body or thermal radiation had in fact 
yielded such a quantized account of the range of values of a harmonic oscillator. From 
the earlier work of Kirchoff, Stefan and others on black,bcxiy radiation, and from Wien's 
mathematical equation of the spectrum of such radiation, Planck arrived at a formula 
which fitted the results of experiment. But in attempting co derive the formula 
mathematically, he was led to a conclusion, at variance with classical physics. in classical 
physics, as the wavelength of electromagnetic radiation decreases, the increase in the 
density of radiant energy should increase in proportion to the square of the frequency. 
The higher the frequency, the higher the energy, without limit, in a continuous function. 
But the observed results showed a different discribution of the radiant energy with 
decrease in wavelength. They exhibit a peak which then falls off rapidly. (1bis came to 
be expressed later by the Rayleigh, Jeans law (pv = 8flv2kn where p increases without 
CJ 
limit as v increases. Jeans could then show an explicit anomaly in the Maxwell theory 
of electromagnetic radiation, the 50,called "ultra,violet catastrophe", but Planck, in 
1900, did not have this formulation available as yet.) Planck's conclusion was that the 
atoms or harmonic oscillators on the surface of the walls of the cavity which emits black, 
body radiation changed energy-Le. absorbed or emitted radiation-only in quantized 
packets of energy. 
Einstein drew on this concept to explain the photoelectric effect. In place of 
thermally induced radiation of the black,bcxiy case, the radiant energy in the photoelec, 
tric effect comes from illumination by the higher frequencies toward the ultraviolet end 
of the spectrum. Limiting himself to these higher or ultraviolet light frequencies (for 
which Wien's law held best) Einstein proposed that the energy of a light quantum or 
photon was proportional to its frequency, in the discrete numerical proportions that 
Planck had proposed (Le. that e=hv, where h = Planck's constant, [i.e. an energy of 
6.62559 x 1 ·27 erg,seconds). In this way, Lenard's result (that the maximum kinetic 
energy of emitted electrons was proportional co the frequency of radiation) could be 
explained by the thesis that this radiation was absorbed or emitted in such quantum 
amounts; in short, that light radiation was corpuscular and not wavelike in this 
interaction, and that increasing the intensity of radiation simply delivered more quanta 
of a given energy, proportional co the frequency. This would account for both the Else er, 
Geitel law and for Lenard's law. 
The conceptual difficulty here was the apparent contradiction between this theory 
of the nature oflight and the highly successful wave theory which lay at the basis of optics 
and explained the phenomena of diffraction, dispersion and refraction of light. To put 
it d iff erentl y, two in compatible mathematical forms confronted each ocher: the cont in u, 
ous spatial functions of the Maxwell theory, and the discrete numbers and spatial 
discontinuities which characterized the quantum description. The mystery deepened as 3
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rhe quantum theory later developed, and as che converse proposition-that matter had 
rhe structure of waves-was developed by De Broglie and others. The conceptual task 
was thus posed of making coherent this apparent duality of pamdes and waves m the 
structure of both matter and radiation. Bue in 1905, Einstein writes of his .. heuristic" 
approach thus: 
It appears co me, in fact, thac the observatiions on 'black body radiation,' 
'phorolumin.escence,' the generating of cathode rays with ultraviolet radia· 
tion, and other groups of phenomena related co the generation and trans­
formation of light can be understood better on the assumption chat the 
energy in light is distributed discontinuously in space. According to the 
presently proposed assumption, the energy from a beam of light emanating 
from a point source is not distributed continuously over larger and larger 
volumes of space hue consists of a ftnite number of energy quanta, localized 
at points of space, which move without subdividing and which are absorbed 
and emitted as units. 2 
So much for the story. What is its moral? How does it bear on the thesis of this paper? 
The thesis is a familiar one: that considerations of form play a heuristic role in scientific 
discovery, and thac chese formal considerations may be characterized as aesthetic. 
Because the thesis is familiar, it is not my aim to argue here chat it is the case-I take thac 
as given-but rather to underscand what chis claim comes co; and more important, co 
explore the question of why aesthetic form does indeed play such a powerful heuristic role 
in scientific thought. 
The thesis that aesthetic form is a desideratum in scientific thought is neither new, 
nor is it especially clear. There is a long tradition in science chat links such aesthetic form 
to scientific thought, and there is a standard and growing list of apt quotations from great 
scientists bearing wimess to the role that considerations of beauty or aesthetic criteria 
played in their moments of discovery. Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, in the 
classical age of modem science; Boltzmann, Helmholtz, Poincare, Einstein, Dirac, 
Heisenberg, Chandrasekhar, Dyson, Wang, Lipscomb, Cyril Smith, Weinberg and many 
others in more recent times have offered testimonials, sometimes examples, more rarely 
explanations of the heuristic role of such considerations. In a recent issue of Science, a 
report-article on current developments on supersymrnetry and supergravication in 
physics waxed eloquent, reporting sentiments among scientists to the effect that theories 
of such abstract beauty must be true. Indeed, it is initially obvious what the character­
izations of these aesthetic components of high theory must include: symmetry, simplicity, 
economy or elegance, completeness, unity or great systemacicity, the comprehension or 
ordering of great complexity by few principles, the stunning expressions of invariance 
through transformation-in short, order, proportion, harmony, all of the standard 
repertoire of those aesthetic properties which mark form in art, as well as in science. It 
is also fairly obvious what are the psychological features of insight, surprise, delight, 
satisfaction,-the aesthetic or intellectual emotions which accompany the epistemo­
logical recognition of deep structures or relations among what were previously regarded 
as disparate phenomena. 
It is also relatively easy to pick out paradigmatic examples from the history of science 
and mathematics: from the earliest discoveries of explicitly mathematical form in nature, 
e.g. in the symmetries discovered by the Pythagorean school in their theory of acoustic 
proportions, in the geometrical order adduced by Platonic cosmology and in the 
4
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discovery of the five regular polyhedra, in che development of lhe symmetry principle in 
vanous applications by Archunedes; and thenceforward through che whole hi.srory of 
science, with favonte scops in Copem1can asrronomy, Newcoman mechanics and oprics, 
hydraulics, chemicaJ theory-{who hasn't heard the story of the empry spaces in the 
penodic table)-<ryscallography, quantum eleccrodynarmcs, ecc. etc. etc. 
AJI of this cells us too much and too little: too much, in that there is an embarras de 
nchesses in all of lhe examples; coo little , in that this plenitude of mscances IS ordered by 
pnnciples at once coo weak and too vague to explain the heunstic force of such aesthetic 
desiderata.True, there are some sustained thematic studies in me history of science, like 
Emile Meyerson's Idenoryand Realiry, there is Weyl's work on symmerry, there is the work 
of Hadamard and Polya on heuristics and discovery in mathematics. But the question 
rem.ams, what exactly is the heuristic character of such approaches? And why do such 
desiderata as symmetry, uniry, economy, etc. play such a role in theory-formation and in 
problem-solving? 
There are severaJ ways to approach these questions. The first may be caJled osceruive 
or revel.arory: one simply points to exemplary or paradigmatic cases, and leaves it to be 
understood by the audience what the role of heuristic form is from the example itself. The 
supposition here is than aesthetic form and its heuristic role will simply show themselves 
in the example being pointed to. The audience will be prepared to know it when they see 
it; they will already have the incipient concepts or background knowledge to recognize 
what is revealed. Were I to adopt this approach, my paper would now be finished, and 
all of you would understand the issue from the bare example. You would, in effect, have 
caught on to the joke without my explaining why it is funny. The second approach may 
be called testimonial: here one simply cites what leading scientific thinkers have said 
about the role of such aesthetic criteria as beauty, symmetry, simpliciry etc., in their own 
work.. One then simply cakes it on the authority of these grear scientists that the thesis 
is true. What vindicates such testimonials is that they are themselves heuristic: they 
suggest that one pay attention to these considerations, and beyond this, also sometimes 
point to exemplary cases, as in the ostensive approach. These seem to me to be the least 
satisfactory, albeit the most common approaches to these questions. 
A third approach has been characteristic of the philosophy of science. One may call 
it a prescriptive,method.ological or prescriptive-logical approach .. Here, one reconstructs 
what is taken to be the proper method of scientific thought. The implicit suggestion to 
the· scientist is: "Do it like this". Such a reconstruction usually has proceeded as a logical 
reconstruction of the formal structure of scientific explanation. Such reconstruction has 
focused on the justification of the beliefs of scientists, rather than on their mode of inquiry 
or on the process of discovery. The process of discovery itself is set aside here as rationally 
unreconstructible, and as lying outside the context of justification, which focuses instead 
on the fonnal srrucrure of completed scientific theory. Insofar as such logical reconstruc­
tion proposes (or claims to reveal) the norms of rationality, of logical coherence and of 
empirical confirmation or testability, it {usually tacitly} proposes a heuristic for theory, 
construction and criteria for what is properly scientific. But [ogical reconstructionists 
wouldn't be caught dead dealing with question of aesthetic form as pan of this 
methodological heuristic. 
A final approach may be called definitional, explicative or interpretive. Here one defines 
the terms "heuristic'', "aesthetic form", etc. and attempts to make exphcit, by the 
interpretation of examples, how these concepts are concretely embodied in scientific 
thought, in moments of discovery, and how indeed, such heuristics and aesthetic criteria 
may develop, or change historically. 
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In this paper, I will eschew the ostensive, tes.timonial, and methodological ap­
proaches and focus on this last definitional-explicative approach. To this end, I will 
begin by attempting to tease out what counts as heuristic in scientific and mathematical 
thought generally, and specifically in the example offered. And then, I hope to show 
what role if any aesthetic form plays here. 
Let me begin by making a distinction between a heumr.ic and an algorithm. Both 
concern ways of proceeding to a given end. Both are therefore also prescriptive: they 
suggest or recommend how one ought to proceed. An algoritlun, however, guarantees 
success: it is defined relative to a known, finite procedure, in which the end-state is 
determined by a sequence of prescribed steps. Thus, the operation of addition is 
algorithmic in arithmetic, in that the end-state-the sum of a series of numbers-is 
defined by the very operation of addition itself. Thus, one cannot fail to arrive at the end­
state, if one proceeds algorithmically. 
The algorithm defines the game, so to speak. The success that an algorithm 
guarantees is the success of playing the game, but not that of winning it. Thus the 
algorithm for chess consists of the rules for initially positioning and moving the pieces. 
If one follows the rules, one is playing chess. Th.ere is, however, no algorithm for winning 
a chess game, (as there is, for example for winning at tic-tac-toe, if the second move 
doesn't occupy the central square). For winning, there are strategies, there are insights, 
there are serendipi'tous moves, but all of these constitute the heuristics of chess. They 
do not guarantee success. Among the rules of art in chess, there are a range of negative 
and positive heuristics, e.g. keep the center strong, avoid moving knights to the edge in 
the opening game, get the pieces in the back.file into play quickly, etc. Thus, generally, 
a heuristic recommends what i.s preferable, what to avoid, what may be fruitful. An 
algorithm defines what is permissible and what is forbidden. Its prescriptions are 
therefore law-like, unlike those of a heuristic. 
In the case of Einstein's "heuristic approach", there is the tentative proposal to 
consider light radiation as quantized, for the sake of  explaining the frequency-depen­
dency of the maximum kinetic energy of emitted electrons. Einstein obviously did not 
rule out in 1905, the wave-models of refraction, diffraction or reflection of light. In fact, 
the alternative field and particle modeis continued as alternatives, through the remark­
able set of conceptual permutations that marked the later development of quantum 
theory, as matter and radiation took on each other's coloring, so to speak. The success 
of Einstein's heuristic approach� then, was not that it resolved the issue between (in his 
words) "The profound formal differences" between particle and wave theories, but 
rather that it posed the question in a new and different way. 
It raised them, moreover, in tenns of the formal-mathematical structure of theoryi 
but at the same time, such a formal structure is taken as a represenuuion of physical 
structure, i.e. it has an ontological interpretation. It is not simply that the equations give 
a better or formally more coherent account of the experimental data, but that light­
what the equations are about, what they refer to-has a granular structure. In effect, the 
mathematics is a model, or is interpreted in a model which is not merely phenomeno­
logical, but which makes a putative claim about the structure of the natural world. 
For example, in the case of Einstein's heuristic approach, the proposal to reconceive 
the nature of light in tenns of a quantized structure within the space�time of classical 
physics is at one and the same time a consideration of the symmetry of the mathematical 
form of expression for the description of both matter and radiation, and therefore, also 
a proposal for an ontological symmetry between the two fields. Thus, when Einstein 
writes that the phenomena in question can be "better understood on the assumption that 
6
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the energy of lighc is distributed disconnnuously m space", the sense of "understand mg 
better", entails the heuristlC nonon that the mathematical and ontological symmetry of 
the structure of matter and radiation in the case of the photoelecrric phenomena yields 
a deeper understanding than does the previous postulation of rwo fundamentally 
different structures. This criterion may be characterized as one concerning the uniry of 
nature, or correlacionally the uniry of physical science 1.11 ts methodology and oncology. 
At the same time, the proffered resolution of this formal asymmerry, or in the one case 
(the photoelectric effect, etc.) duality gives rise to a still deeper asymmetry,, for it now 
poses as a problem the remaining field-structures of electromagnetic radiation, and the 
remaining granular or particulate structures of matter. With the development of 
quantum-mechanics after 1925, these questions were sharpened, by the introduction of 
probabilistic characterizations of the classical parameters of the spatial location of the 
quantized paclets of energy, so that the "schizophrenic" conception of the "wave­
pack.et", and the still more exotic notion of its "collapse" in the event of a measurement­
operarion radically put in question the ontological coherence of the prior (wave/particle) 
structures, and led to the invention of alternative ontologies (of matter, of energy) as well 
as to the view that both classical oncologies had co be abandoned, in favor of purely 
phenomenological-mathematical descriptions, or of an uninterpreted mathematical 
formalism which simply was predictively successful. "Damn the ontology, full steam 
ahead", so to speak. 
The heuristic approach, then, is at once methodological--conceming a way of 
proceeding mathematically-and ontological-concerning a model of the :real world, 
i.e. an interpreted formal s,stem. Its feature, as an adequate representation, then, is its 
systematicity as a model: consequences flow from it. It defines a domain which is to be 
grasped coherently, or understood in terms of, or through the formal representation itself. 
The conditions on the representation itself, then, are that it yield to such systematic 
comprehension, i.e. that it is both formally and interpretively or physically coherent, as 
far as it goes. To put this differently, the model has to be testable in its interpretation: its 
consequences obtain their physical significance only when the interpretati.on can be 
empirically or experimentally confronted. In short, such heuristic models are proposals 
to see the world in the form of the model; and where such interpreted formal structures 
radically revise a prevailing world-picture, they invite us to see or comprehend the world 
differently; they exercise our imaginations in the interests of world revision. They are 
utopian projects to be realized in the practice of inquiry itself. 
But here, it seems to me, is the deepest affinity between discovery, as theory 
construction and theory revision in science, and discovery as construction and style­
revision in the arts. For it is through alternative modes or styles of representation or of 
construction in the arts that we come to see or comprehend what was beyond our visual, 
aural or linguistic imagination before. The artist discovers (or creates, invents) alterna­
tive world-models, whether of color, of shape, of sound, of imagery, of linguistic meaning 
in the artifacts which function as artworks. It is the form of the work which makes it 
graspable, available to comprehension, which orders our visual field in the plastic arts, 
or the structures and temporal sequences of sound, imagery, feeling or meaning in music, 
literature, the dramatic arts. The artist, like the scientific theorist, makes available to the 
mind's�eye and ear of others what has been grasped, discovered, understood, created by 
his or her own mind's-eye, in the imagination. The artistic creation, like the scientific 
discovery, explores the possibilities of human conception, of what the mind can construct 
in the forms which permit these discoveries or insights to be shared, or communicated 
to others. The constraint here is the language or the symbolic form in which such insights 7
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can be represented, and the conditions under which such constructions can be 
rransmitted. No artist, and no scientist invenrs a new language, but works to revise, 
reform the conunon language, to extend its range and its reference to include what has 
been grasped in the act of discovery. Thus theory change in science, and analogously, 
style change in art are both continuous and discontinuous with what they are changes 
from: they are hisrnry-bound innovations. 
Thus, Einstein's heuristic proposal malces sense as a discovery or the creation of an 
alternative model only against the background of the history of physics, of the prevailing 
theories of matter and radiation, of the Wien Law, of  Planck's 1900 paper on black-body 
radiation, of the work of Boltzmann, Lenard and others. Einstein, s concern for the formal 
incompatibility of the two models is not in itself reason enough for proposing an 
alternative view of light radiation: there may, in fact, simply be two discrete structures 
in naiture, irreducible to each other. In fact, false unified theories abound in che history 
of science, and one may counterpose a heuristic of multiple structures- i.e. of complexity 
- to one of unity or simplicity. Or, it may be that the human mind has evolved two 
complementary and distinct structures of comprehension, the one marked by the 
discreteness and atomicity of elements in combination or relation, the other, by 
continuities. "Particle" and "'field" may be, as some have suggested, not features of the 
physical world but rather the limiting forms of two alternative a priori, or evolved 
structures of comprehensibility of human understanding, both of which are necessary for 
the dialectic development of our scientific world picture. The duality or complementarity 
of granular and neld-theoretic models, may be the limiting polarities of our approxima­
tions of nature, rather than unity. But then, we have competing heuristics. The 
desideratum of unity, as a merely aesthetic desideratum would not have produced the 
1905, paper. Rather, it was the solution of a problem which prompted the heuristic 
proposal. Yet, the problem could not have been solved, if the stimulation of what were 
considerations of aesthetic form hadn't suggested a bold move, a change in the angle of 
vision, a revision of a well-established world-picture . 
One may understand Cezanne's innovation against the background of the work of 
Corot, Courbet, El Greco, Pisarro; yet, when cezanne made his moves, the desiderata 
of aesthetic form which moved him to his construction of a new vision of nature, of light, 
of mass, of the shape and look of things had to be framed in the technical language of 
painting. They concerned the creation of a new coherent structure of pigment on a 
surface, a new vocabulary of shapes in order to represent his vision, so that we could come 
to see the world cezannishly. So too, in scientific discovery, it is the construction of a 
representation-an alternative formal structure with a putative physical interpreta­
tion-which permits the speakers of a community of practitioners of the common 
language-in this case physics--to "'catch on" to the heuristic suggestions for a revised 
vision of the world which the scientist proposes. It is this, in effect, which marks the act 
of discovery in science as a social act. Its aesthetic dimension is, it seems to me, rooted 
in those same requirements for comprehensibility,-namely, the desiderata of order, 
form, beauty -which mark the enjoyment of art. In both cases, the human mind comes 
to appreciate its own capacity to understand the world, and here, I suggest, lie some of 
the deepest sources of that pleasure which we characterize as aesthetic, and which 
Spinoza called "'the intellectual love of God", a metaphor to which Einstein's own view 
is strikingly close. 
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Footnotes 
A. Einstcin, "On a Heuristic Viewpouu Concerning the Producuon and 
Transformation of light." Annalen deT- Plrysik, June, 1905. 
lbitl. 
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